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Abstract

This paper attempts to answer the question: does the current employment management system of civil
service in Tunisia incentivize performance? This paper is a case study that provides background
information on the Tunisian civil service employment, and offers analysis based on existing legislation
and reports, as well as expert interviews. The paper’s findings are: First, it does not have an evaluation
system that separates high performers from low performers. Second, the current compensation structure
and promotion mechanisms do not reward high performers.
Based on the Tunisian context and other different case studies, this paper makes suggestions regarding
approach to reform, evaluation system and reward system. Recommendations include decentralization,
design of a job catalogue and quantifiable evaluation metrics, as well as reform of compensation structure
and promotion mechanisms to better tie them to performance.
Keywords: civil service, employment system, performance, evaluation system, reward
Discipline: Business

Introduction

Public services in Tunisia have generally been criticized by citizens. In February 2017, the
satisfaction rate with public services in Tunisia was only 44% (Sondage: l'administration
insatisfaisante pour 56% des tunisiens. Mosaique FM), significantly lower than the OECD 2012
average, which ranges from 60% to 72% depending on the service category in 2012 (OECD
2013). While public management involves different elements, this paper focuses on employment
management, more specifically the management of incentives.
While industrial relations are different between the private and public sectors, and while this
paper recognizes the existence of some degree of intrinsic motivation in civil service, there is a
reason to believe that the management of incentives plays a central role in employee
performance. This paper draws on “Agency Theory” – used in the literature - to justify the
premise of this paper: that there should be a link between incentives and performance (OECD
2005). “Agency Theory”, argues that “performance incentives are needed when the principal
(the employer) cannot easily monitor the agent’s (employee’s) work effort”( (OECD 2005).
Monitoring being impossible (at least in the narrow definition of the term), public sector
employment presents an example of a principal-agent problem where the government is the
principle (which provides the economic sources), and the employee being the agent (who acts on
the behalf of the principle) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Many countries have acknowledged this
reality, as demonstrated by an increasing adoption of the “New Public Management” (NPM),
which introduces market-oriented governance mechanisms and private sector techniques of
human resource management (Bordogna 2008).

This paper explores whether the current civil service employment management system in Tunisia
incentivizes high performance. To answer this question, the paper draws on examination of
Tunisian legislation, analysis reports and academic literature, as well as expert interviews. The
paper finds that the current evaluation system does not separate low from high performers, and
that the compensation structure and promotion mechanisms in place do not reward high
performers.
The paper then proposes reforms that derive from the current analysis as well as the examination
of relevant case studies. Recommendations include decentralization, design of a job catalogue
and quantifiable evaluation metrics, more emphasis on Performance-related pay (PRP) and
redesign of promotion mechanisms.
This paper aims to contribute an analysis-based perspective to individuals and entities interested
in civil service employment reform in Tunisia. It also presents a case study of civil service
employment management and public management. Finally, the paper gives substantial
background details, which could help introduce unfamiliar and yet interested researchers, to the
complex employment management system of the Tunisian civil service.

Background

1- Public Sector Structure:
Public sector, civil service and employment regimes:
Tunisia’s public sector is constituted of both government administrative agencies and stateowned enterprises (SOEs) (Portail de la Présidence du Gouvernement – Tunisie n.d.), so public

sector employment includes both civil service and employment in state-owned enterprises (Saidi,
Administrator Advisor in the eneral Committee of the Civil Service 2017). Civil service agents
are (1) State Officials - or officials who work in ministries, (2) employees of local authorities
(municipal and regional councils) and (3) employees in state institutions of administrative nature.
These are state agencies that do not have financial autonomy or their own legal status: rights and
obligations, but rather derive from the government. (Saidi 2017). The focus of this paper will be
civil service because it is related to establishments that are less likely to be part of privatization
discussions, at least in the near future.
More generally, the public sector employment is governed by eight different employment
regimes, one of which is related to employment in state-owned enterprises, and seven of which
fall under the civil service umbrella and include: (1) Officials of the State, Local Authorities and
State Institutions of Administrative Nature, (2) Members of the Judiciary, (3) Members of the
Administrative Court, (4) Members of the Court of Auditors, (5) Members of the Military, (6)
Members of the Internal Security Forces and (7) Custom Agents (Zarrouk, Séminaire: "Les
approches Comparatives sur la Modernisation de la Fonction Publique des Pays de l'OCDE"
2008). The focus of the paper is the first cited regime: Officials of the state, Local Authorities
and State Institutions, because this regime covers most civil service employees and is not highly
specialized, and will therefore not require technical knowledge of fields, unlike the military,
internal security, customs or the judicial branch. This focus regime – generally referred to as
“General Civil Service” - is further divided into officials (“fonctionnaires”), workers

(“ouvriers”) 1, temporary staff (“personnel temporaire”) (Law 83-112, Article 16 1983). This
paper will focus on officials and will refer to them as “civil servants”.
The public sector employment regime is also divided into 130 “corps” or professional groups,
including the corps of teachers, the corps of financial inspectors, the corps of general
administrators (“corps administratif commun”) (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015).
This notion of “corps” will be relevant to future sections of the paper.
Governing authority and legislation:
All employment regimes are governed by the law. The body responsible for managing public
sector employment policies is the General Committee of the Civil Service (CGFP), which is part
of the Chief of Government Cabinet (Ministere de l'Action et de la Fonction Publique n.d.). The
focus employment regime in this paper - the “General Civil Service” regime – is governed by
the law 83-112 of December 12,1983, known as the “General Statute of Civil Service”. This
Statute is the foundational law that governs public employment management, ranging from
compensation to recruitment and promotion mechanisms.
Specifics of public employment management are governed by complementary decrees and corpsspecific decrees, known as “Particular Statutes”. Decrees are results of parliamentary voting, and
are issued in the Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia (“Journal Officiel de la Republique
Tunisienne”: JORT), signed by the Chief of the Executive Branch, previously the President of
the Republic until 2011 and currently the Head of Government – equivalent to Prime Minister –
as dictated by the new constitution of January 26th, 2014. Public-employment specifics in
Particular Statutes only depend on the corps not on the organization per se, and are therefore
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uniform across all government administrative agencies if the corps is found in more than one
agency.
Public employment management decisions of administrative order, such as recruitment opening,
content of entry exams, announcements of promoted agents, are announced by the ministry of
interest in an Order also published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia (JORT).
2- Civil Service Employment Overview
Civil service in Tunisia follows a career-based system, which is inspired by the French
Administration, and is also followed by other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries,
such as Algeria, Lebanon and Morocco (OECD 2010). In this system, an employee is typically
recruited in a specific grade that correspond to their education degree, receives seniority-based
pay increases, is tenured within a relatively short amount of time, and has limited mobility across
government agencies (OECD 2010). This is different from the position-based system, which is
the United Kingdom’s Westminster model, and is followed by some MENA countries, such as
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and UAE (OECD 2010). This system is generally characterized by more
flexibility and recruitment based on technical skills (OECD 2010).
Education-based classification: Categories
When recruited, employees are places in grades that correspond to categories, exclusively
determined by level of education. They could move up these grades through internal promotion.
The specific grades depend on the corps that the employee belongs to, but these grades
correspond to one of 4 categories: A,B,C and D. Category A is further divided into subcategories
A1, A2 and A3 (Law 83-112, Article 16 1983). The table below summarizes these categories and
corresponding levels of education. The third column is an illustrative example of how categories

translate into grades, using the corps of general administrators (“corps administratif commun”)
as the focus corps (Decree 85-261, Articles 2,3 and 4; Decree 85-267, Article 3 1985).
Category
A1

Corresponding level of education
Masters degree or equivalent

Grade

A2

Bachelor degree or equivalent

Administrator ("Administrateur")

A3

2 years of university

Administration Officer ("Attaché d’Administration")
Executive Officer ("Attaché de Direction")

B

High school diploma

Secretary of Administration ("Secrétaire d’Administration")
Executive Secretary ("Secrétaire de Direction")

C

Some high school: 4 years after
elementary school

D

Completed elementary school

General Administrator ("Administrateur Général")
Chief Administrator ("Administrateur en Chef")
Advisory Administrator ("Administrateur Conseiller")

Administrative Clerk ("Commis d’Administration")
Typist ("Dactylographe")
Typist Assistant ("Dactylographe Adjoint")
Front Desk Receptionist ("Agent D'accueil")

In addition to grades, employees can be appointed to managerial positions, including Head of
Service (“Chef de Service”), Assistant Director (“Sous-Directeur”), Director (“Directeur”),
Managing Director (“Directeur Géneral”) and Secretary General in the Ministry (“Secrétaire
Général du Ministère”) (Saidi 2017). These appointments are less automatic, as they are rather
related to employees’ experiences and careers as civil servants.
Civil Service Employment Management Overview
Before identifying the areas where performance and incentives are disconnected and the
implications of these disconnections, we explain in this section the basics of employment
management system in Tunisia: recruitment, compensation structure, promotion and sanctions.
Recruitment
50% of positions in the categories A, B and C are filled through external recruiting, the other
50% are filled through internal promotion (Law 83-112 1983). External recruiting for these

categories happens in two ways. First, employees may be recruited through competitive
recruitment procedures (“concours”), which takes the form of exams or applications-based
selection (“concours sur dossier”) (Law 83-112 1983). Procedural details are determined by the
Particular Statutes (Law 83-112 1983). Eligibility criteria usually include the required level of
education, which is in many times defined by an exact degree, as opposed to being the minimum
required. For example, a person who holds a Masters degree may not be eligible for a position
that requires a Bachelor’s degree. Second, employees may be recruited through direct
appointment if they are students from approved schools such as L’Ecole Nationale
d’Administration (Law 83-112 1983).
Recruiting for category D occurs only externally, and procedural details are determined by the
Particular Statute in the specifically associated decree (Law 83-112 1983).
Compensation structure
Compensation for Civil Service employees is constituted of the base salary, allowances including common allowances, corps-specific allowances and special allowances - and a
quarterly performance bonus (Decree 72-358 1972). Employees with managerial positions
(“fonctions”) receive managerial allowances too (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015).
Most the salary is based on the salary base and allowances; only about 2% of total compensation
is based on performance. 2
Each corps has a salary grid, constituted of two types of base salary increases: seniority-based
increase and promotion-based increase. The seniority-based increase is automatic, and the
increase rate and frequency are determined by the Particular Statute. In general, there is an
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increase every year for the first 4 years, then every 2 years thereafter. There exists 25 levels so
that an employee who joins at age 18 and stays in the same grade until retirement at 65 would be
able to keep receiving salary increases over the 47 years of their career (Saidi 2017). A
promotion results in a promotion-based increase, but resets seniority-based level to the first level
– unless this would result in a lower salary than the pre-promotion salary. In this case, the
employee stays at their current seniority-based level (Law 83-112 1983).

Promotion
When ministries decide to open positions, 50% occur through external recruitment, as previously
stated, and 50% occur internally (Law 83-112 1983). Some ambiguity exists around promotions,
based on different legislative texts (Law 83-112 and Decree 85-262). Combining article 18 from
the Law 83-112 and articles 2 through 7 of Decree 85-262, there are three ways of promotion.
The first is successful completion of a continuous training cycle. The second is an internal
competitive recruitment procedure (“concours interne”), but only employees with 5 years
seniority in their current grade are eligible for this promotion mode. The third, called “choicebased promotion”, uses a point-based system and is only used for 10% of civil servants to be

promoted, who have at least 10 years of seniority in current grade, as an opportunity to be
promoted if other means did not work out. It is only offered once in an employee’s career. The
minister from the ministry of interest announces the promoted employees in an Order published
in the Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia (JORT).
Tenure and Sanctions
Automatic tenure is implied after 4 years of employment (Law 83-112 1983). Disciplinary action
includes warning, rebuke and termination of employment contract (even given tenure) without
prior notice (Law 83-112 1983). It was found, however, that besides warning and rebuke,
sanctions (such as temporary suspension, transfer with change of residence, and dismissal) are
very rare (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015).
3- Civil Service Size:
Most recent statistics (2015)
The number of civil service employees across all civil service employment regimes reached
604,200 in 2015 of which 36.3% are women and 478,800 of which are civil servants (the focus
employees in this paper) (National Institute of Statistics 2015). 3
The number of civil servants is highest in the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public Health,
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Youth and Sports, respectively.
Ministry
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Public Health

3

Number of Civil Servants
171,657
57,941

Percentage of Civil Servants
36.3%
12.2%

Caractéristique des agents de la fonction publique 2011-2015 – Partie 1 : L’évolution des caractéristiques des
agents de la fonction publique 2011-2015 – par l’institut national de statistiques

Ministry of Higher Education
and Scientific Research
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Youth and Sports

25,166

5.3%

16,453
15,607

3.5%
3.3%

The number of civil servants is divided into categories as follows, showing that over 60% of civil
servants have at least some university education. Moreover, A2 category civil servants represent
the highest percentage of all civil servants, which may be partially explained by governments’
efforts to limit unemployment of university graduates (A2 corresponds to holders of Bachelor’s
degrees).

Number of Civil Servants per Category
180,000
160,000
162,200
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000

97,300
83,700

60,000
58,300

40,000

49,900

20,000

23,300

0
Categorie Categorie Categorie Categorie Categorie Categorie
A1
A2
A3
B
C
D

Evolution of numbers since 2011:
Since the Arab Spring that concluded in a political change in Tunisia on January 14th, 2011, the
country has been undergoing a democratic transition, and that also did not come without
economic challenges. With declining foreign investment and GDP growth as well as increasing
unemployment, the government played the role of employer of last resort (Brockmeyer,

Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). In fact, the number of civil servants increased by about 25%,
going from 352,200 in 2011 to 474,800 in 2015 (National Institute of Statistics 2015).
This change is more noticeable in categories A2 and A3 where numbers doubled in category A2,
compared to drop in numbers by a third in the A3 category. This could be explained by the wave
of recruitment and possibly the increased number of those automatically promoted from category
A2 to category A3 category (National Institute of Statistics 2015). The increase is also noticeable
in the C category, where numbers almost quadrupled, increasing from 14,000 to 49,900 between
2011 and 2015 (National Institute of Statistics 2015).
Category
A2
A3

2011
87,200
109,400

2015
162,300
83,700

The three ministries with highest increase rates in the total number of employees (including both
civil servants and workers) between 2011 and 2015 are the Ministry of Public Health, Ministry
of Agriculture and Ministry of Youth and Sports with percentage increases of 115%, 92% and
43% respectively (National Institute of Statistics 2015). While low in percentage increase, The
Ministry of Education added a significant number of recruits (L’Ecole Nationale
d’Administration n.d.).
Ministry
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Youth and Sports
Ministry of Education

Approximate percentage
increase
115%
92%
43%
0.5%

Number of recruits
14,570
13,900
5,450
9,980

These increases are also reflected in the rise in numbers of “corps” (professional groups) from
114 in 2008 to 130 in 2015 (Zarrouk, Séminaire: "Les approches Comparatives sur la

Modernisation de la Fonction Publique des Pays de l'OCDE" 2008), which could be largely due
to the desire of different groups to have additional specific rights or advantages.
Current “Wage Bill” crisis
After the revolution, the government has not only been pressured to increase recruiting but also
to increase compensation. For example, 7 strikes were organized in June 2015 by State-Owned
Enterprises employees alone (Temps 2015).
The median pre-tax salary of civil service employees (both civil servants and workers) increased
from 1127.5 TND in 2011 to 1388.9 TND in 2015 (National Institute of Statistics 2015).

Increase in the Monthly Median Salary (TND)
1500

1400

1388.9
1334.3

1300

1287.3

1200

1184.7
1127.5

1100

1000
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

This increase in median salary is explained by a decrease in number of employees in the lower
partition of salaries and increase in number of employees in the higher paritition of salaries,
reflecting an overall increase in salaries of Civil Servants (National Institute of Statistics 2015).
Salary range (in TND)
Lower than 700
700-900
900-1100
1100-1300

Percentage in 2011
3.2
17.8
21.5
27.8

Percentage in 2015
0.3
2.5
13.6
24

1300-1500
1500-1700
1700-2000
2000 and higher

11.1
6.6
4.5
7.5

16.3
19.9
13.3
10.1

Today, the wage bill is budgeted to 52% of the total 2018 budget. 4 5 With about 20% budgeted
for external debt payment, less than 30% of the budget is left for development-oriented
investments, and the government does not really have any fiscal space. 6
That being said, we believe that the current crisis is a manifestation of an underlying structural
problem, and the groups-led changes reflect a weak current system/non-systematic changes
reflect flaws in the system. In this paper, we hope to shed light on some of the weaknesses and
offer alternatives.

Analysis
This paper argues that a major weakness in the Tunisian civil service’s employment management
system is that it does not incentivize high performance. First, the evaluation system in place does
not separate high performers from low performers in a systematic way. Second, the current
compensation structure and promotion mechanisms do not incentivize high performance.
1- An evaluation system unable to separate high from low performers in a systematic way

4
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The system in place does not have systematic mechanisms to separate high performers from low
performers, which is a prerequisite for establishing a link between incentives and performance.
This is illustrated by weak evaluation metrics, which are partially explained by vague job
descriptions that are neither task-specific nor skills-specific. Moreover, jobs are not specific to
organizations but rather to “corps”, which means they are - for the most part - uniform across
organizations. This high degree of centralization makes jobs more dependent on industrial
relations of that time and less dependent on organizations’ needs. This section expands on these
different elements and explains how they they interact with each other in a way that hinders the
evaluation system.
Evaluation metrics
The evaluation system takes the form of two employee ratings, both based on vague and nonquantifiable criteria. The first rating is the annual professional rating (“note professionnelle”),
which de jure plays a role in some promotion modes but has de facto been playing a less
significant role. The second rating is the quarterly performance rating, which is tied to the
quarterly performance bonus. The following table summarizes the criteria used in both ratings in
the Ministry of Infrastructure, based on a case study conducted by researchers in the World Bank
(Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015).
Criteria

Weight

Professional rating

Work quality
Work quantity
Interpersonal relationships and conduct
Attendance
Perseverance

20%
20%
20%
20%
20%

Performance rating

Work quality

40%

Work quantity
Attendance

40%
20%

Criteria such as work quality, work quantity and perseverance are not defined through a more
detailed rubric. Since these criteria are rated by each employee’s immediate supervisor, their
definitions are left to the discretion of this supervisor who will use personal judgement in
assigning ratings due to the limited guidance. It is therefore not surprising that attributing full
ratings to all employees full is common practice. In fact, most employees receive at least 95 out
of 100 in their professional rating, and the evaluation meeting that is supposed to be held once a
year is almost never held (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). It would also not be
surprising for this rating to highly depend on the personal relationship between employees and
their immediate supervisors. Similar practices can be inferred about the performance rating. The
poor design of the evaluation system makes evaluation quasi-absent in practice and vulnerable to
internal politics.
Job Descriptions
Employees cannot be evaluated based on specific criteria if their roles are not sufficiently
specific to be translated into targets. While in practice many employees have assigned tasks, the
lack of specification on paper makes it impossible to reform the evaluation system in a
systematic way, and makes the recruitment system vulnerable to unnecessary recruits. As an
illustration for the vagueness of job descriptions, the table below summarizes the different roles
of the “corps of general administrators” (“corps administratif commun”), as described in Decree
85-267 of February 15th, 1985.
Grade

Role

General Administrator ("Administrateur Général")

Management, conception and coordination. They can also
be charged of studies or general inspection.

Chief Administrator ("Administrateur en Chef")

Management, conception and coordination. They can also
be charged of studies or control or inspection.

Administrator Advisor ("Administrateur Conseiller")

Administration, management, control and inspection tasks
in specific services.

Administrator ("Administrateur")

Under the authority of their supervisor, they work on
legislative projects - including laws, decrees, regulations
and orders - and establish necessary modes for execution.
They can also be responsible of ensuring the administrative
or financial management of a specific service.

Administration Officer ("Attaché d’Administration")

Assist administrators and participate, under the authority of
their supervisors, in completing tasks they are entrusted
with.

Executive Officer ("Attaché de Direction")

Assit Administration Officers and participate, under the
authority of their supervisors, in completing tasks they are
entrusted with.

Secretary of Administration ("Secrétaire
d’Administration")

Assit Executive Officers and participate, under the
authority of their supervisors, in completing tasks they are
entrusted with.

Executive Secretary ("Secrétaire de Direction")

Responsible of tasks related to their professional
qualifications, namely typing and managing mails.

Administrative Clerk ("Commis d’Administration")

Responsible of administrative tasks, such as organization,
accounting and simple communication.

Typist ("Dactylographe")

Responsible of tasks related to their professional
qualifications, and could be responsible of organization
and writing tasks.

Typist Assistant ("Dactylographe Adjoint")
Front Desk Receptionist ("Agent D'accueil")

Typing and basic writing tasks.
Serve as liaisons between bureaus and services.

The roles described above are not only generic but also overlapping. Responsibilities are often
just referred to as tasks but without clarifying what these tasks refer to. Moreover, descriptions
neither include the exact skills needed nor the way the role fits within an organization or
overarching mission. These flaws are likely to make individual accountability more difficult and
make the system more vulnerable to internal politics. More importantly, they are likely to inhibit
reform attempts of evaluation metrics, because a non-clearly defined job cannot be properly
evaluated.
Goals for agencies and for employees

It is probably difficult to make responsibilities specific when they are uniform across agencies.
While there is implicit knowledge of the difference in the work at one agency versus another, the
lack of systemization remains a problem. While members of the same “corps” in different
administrations have parallels in their roles, the tasks are not likely to be the same. More
importantly, the output – or the work they produce – is certainly not the same since
administrations differ in purpose and activity. Currently however, organization-specific roles will
not be sufficient because administrations themselves lack measurable goals and Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs) (Labbaoui 2017). It is therefore difficult to design metrics for
employees in absence of organization metrics.
High centralization
Centralization is demonstrated – for example - by the involvement of governing ministries not
only in recruitment procedural details (Law 83-112, Article 16), but also in details related to
promotions such as training program details, exams and conditions for passing these exams
(Decree 85-263, Article 4). More importantly, it is illustrated in the uniform and generic job
descriptions, as well as lack of organization-specific metrics. This degree of centralization may
result, perhaps counter-intuitively, in an unexpected lack of accountability. In fact, the literature
presents four major components which enforce public accountability (Haque 2000): First is the
external-formal mechanisms, which include legislative instruments, executive means and judicial
processes. Second is the external-informal mechanisms, including interest groups, opinion polls
and media scrutiny. Third is internal-formal means, including codes of conducts, official
hierarchies and performance reviews. Fourth is internal-informal mechanisms, such as
organizational culture, professional ethics and peer pressure. While legislations representing
external-formal mechanisms exist and while the role of media and different groups has been

increasing post-revolution, centralization weakens the third component that enforces public
accountability.

This first section of the analysis is summarized in the diagram below. Overall, a weak evaluation
system increases information asymmetry, which makes the system vulnerable to the principleagent problem – currently manifesting itself in a lack of satisfaction with services, paired with a
large wage bill.

2- A system that does not incentivize high performance
Besides being unable to separate high from low performers because of weaknesses
related to the evaluation system, the system in place does not incentivize high
performance, and this is manifested in the current compensation structure as well as
promotion mechanisms.
Compensation structure
“The current compensation structure prioritizes the notion of egalitarianism”, as Minister Ahmed
Zarrouk described (Zarrouk, Advisor to the head of government in charge of civil service,
governance and administrative reform 2017). While the intention is well-noted, the egalitarian
principle does not seem to ensure fairness to high performers since their efforts are not rewarded.

Currently, the most of the compensation is fixed – as mentioned in the background section – and
the quarterly performance bonus represents about 2% of the overall compensation. For example,
an inspection officer in the Bureau of Finances (category A3) receives a monthly salary of 1200
TND, a yearly allowance around 5000 TND and a quarterly bonus performance of up to
135TND. This means that over a year, this civil servant’s performance accounts for only 2.78%
of her compensation. Moreover, as referred earlier, little variation exists in the performance
rating across all employees, which leads to the performance bonus to be considered as an integral
part of the salary (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). This means that compensation
is 97-98% fixed on paper and 100% fixed in practice, which means that high-performers are not
monetarily rewarded for their high performers, and low performers lose nothing for performing
poorly.
This could potentially result in the highly undesirable outcome of adverse selection – that civil
service attract low-performing employees. High-performers may become likely to choose the
private sector instead in order to be rewarded for their performance – especially if economic
conditions improve and result in more job creation in the private sector. While we do not have
sufficient data to make a definite claim, come informal interviews indicated talent retention as a
current challenge in Civil Service – even if this was mentioned more in the context of comparing
senior management salaries with those of private sector.

Promotion
Continuous training cycle
Promotion through continuous training cycle is the one that most emphasizes competence
development for the next grade.

Civil servants who wish to be promoted undertake continuous training cycles, which last 6
months for those who wish to be promoted from category A3 to category A2 or from category
A2 to category A1, and 4 months for those who wish to be promoted from category B to
category A3 (Hamam 2018). Currently, there is no continuous training cycle for employees in
categories C and D (Hamam 2018).
While this promotion mechanism aims to develop competences needed in the next grade, it
implies that promotion depends on performance on the training cycle, but not performance on the
current job - as promotion depends on performance in the exit exam.
In addition, admissions to these training cycles present a set of issues. Admissions require a
preparatory phases, which consists of distance-learning of modules that add up to 15 credits, and
which can range from Public Finance and Fiscality to Constitutional Law, Commercial Law,
Economics and Environmental studies (Order of July 14th, 1995 n.d.). The admissions exam
takes place about twice a year, and requires a weighted average of 10/20 to pass (L’Ecole
Nationale d’Administration n.d.).
This mode of admissions is problematic first because it bases admission to a promotion
opportunity by studying, not by performing well on the job. Second, studying requires a high
time commitment, which makes promotion difficult to access. In fact, no more than 300 civil
servants pass the admissions exams each year (Hamam 2018). Accessibility is even more
challenging for employees of interior regions, due to the absence of means of pedagogical
support and due to commuting costs to take the exams. This n turn contributes to a slowdown in
career advancement, because the training sessions are only offered if there is a minimum number
of participants. Further, this promotion mechanism – in its current form – seems to be penalizing
high performers. In Ahmed Zarrouk’s words, “The promotion system in place does not

encourage those who work. On the contrary, it penalizes those who work” (Zarrouk 2017). As he
further explained, hard-workers are given more tasks and responsibilities, and thus do not have
the time to prepare for those exams; they are therefore less likely to be promoted.
Internal Competitive procedure
Internal competitive procedure normally takes the form of application or exam. While the exam
itself has a set of imperfections, there has been increasing use of the application-based
competitive procedure, which is problematic for three reasons. First, it promotes the use of a
budget-based promotion, instead of promotion based on organization needs (Saidi 2017):
promotion budgets are negotiated between ministries and the Ministry of Finance, then each
ministry decides how many promotions they will offer and for which grade based on the budget
they receive. Most grades are decided based on budgets and distributive efforts, not on agencies’
needs. Based on the number of eligible candidates, the percentage of promotion is preannounced. While it has historically been around 30 to 50% rate, it has often become around
100% in recent years (Saidi 2017) due to union negotiations and pressures. This is evidence of
the flaw in the way number of promotions is determined, as it becomes vulnerable to industrial
relations and political climates, and less institutionalized. Second, this easy process could be
crowding out the demand for continuous training cycles, which has been decreasing in recent
years (Hamam 2018). Third, this mechanism emphasizes seniority, which effectively means that
civil servants with more seniority are promoted, and no further effort is required.
By having promotion mechanisms that do not reflect performance, high performers interested in
career advancement and more responsibilities are unlikely to find what they look for as civil
servants. This could make it difficult for government to retain those desired talents, where these

types of employees would leave for other opportunities, which further increases the risk for
adverse selection.
In summary, even if high performers are successfully identified, there are no mechanisms to
reward them. The current compensation structure is fixed both by design and by practice.
Different promotion mechanisms also have different flaws. Continuous training cycles have
demanding admissions criteria, which hinders its accessibility, but also makes promotion tied to
competence acquired in the training, instead of job performance. The next section of the paper
proposes solutions, based on this diagnosis, as well as practices in other case studies.

Proposed Solutions
Overall Approach to Reform
The first significant reform was attempted in 1989, followed by different reform initiatives.
However, the problems identified in 1989 – as identified in the Seminar on Modernizing the
Administration in 1989 - persist today (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). While this
could be attributed to multiple factors, two possible explanations may be offered.
First, the publicly available information from the seminar’s conclusions comes in the form of
weakness-recommendation pairs, not in the form of specific steps. To overcome this issue,
reform proposals need to take a process approach and come in the form of action plans instead,
by outlining specific steps, as well as the prerequisites they need to be executed.
Second, this could be explained by the Behavioral Economics concepts of Planning Fallacy and
Optimism Bias (Raballand and Anand 2013). Planning Fallacy stands for “the tendency of
people and organizations to underestimate the time it will take to complete a task” (Raballand

and Anand 2013). Optimism Bias is the “belief that despite the evidence of past projects, the
current project is somehow exempt from the risks that affected previous attempts” (Raballand
and Anand 2013). In the context of civil service reform, these biases mean that governments tend
to underestimate the time to implement reform projects and to be overoptimistic about the project
outcomes, and the Tunisian government is probably not an exception (Raballand and Anand
2013). This contributes to ambitious visions that are difficult to translate into small actions and
observable improvements. Smaller scale projects may be effective in reducing these two biases,
as suggested by a World Bank project in Cameroon’s Customs (Raballand and Anand 2013).
While much of the reform involves systemization, the actual implementation may need to be
delegated and piloted on small scales. In the mentioned World Bank project, the pilot project was
effective in engaging and onboarding stakeholders, improving the outcomes in an observable and
significant way, measuring progress in a tangible way, and collecting feedback. Such small scale
projects have therefore the potential to provide feedback on the envisioned time frame and
results, helping reduce the two biases. That being said, this approach will challenge the
egalitarian culture, as the success of such approach depends on the small scale, and thus on an
active decision to choose one pilot organization and not others. Communicating the vision and
collaborating with international organizations such as the World bank could help navigate the
politics of reform.
Reforming the Evaluation System
The Tunisian government needs to pursue decentralization in order to design a job catalogue, and
design better evaluation metrics that will be able to separate high performers from low
performers.

Decentralization
The Tunisian government needs to decentralize the civil service employment system in order to
improve the evaluation system. The first step of decentralization is between the head of
government and ministries. Some governments have been decentralizing their employment
management systems. For example, the employment system in Denmark consists of a central
unit – the Agency of Modernization of Public Administration at Ministry of Finance – which is
responsible for defining human resource (HR) policy. However, recruitment, management of
bonuses and performance appraisals are managed by HR units in ministries of interest (OECD,
Denmark 2012). Denmark is referred to as an example because it has among the highest citizens
satisfaction rates with public service OECD satisfaction. The second step of decentralization is
between ministries and related agencies. Furthermore, Canada’s reform project in the 1990s
showed that holding specific decision-makers in these agencies, namely directors and managers,
accountable for implementation results has proven more effective in increasing accountability
(Labbaoui 2017). Decentralization at the government level and further delegation to related
agencies, while holding specific decision-makers accountable could make decentralization
effective and help set a foundation for the reform of evaluation system.
Job Catalogue Design
The generic and overlapping job descriptions need to be replaced by a job catalogue that defines
the nature of the job activity as well as the way the way the role fits into the organization. In
addition, it should not be based on education as the only eligibility criterion for applicants, but
rather on skills and competences required to perform the job. This reform step has proven
feasible in Morocco, which is also a career-based system that uses a corps-category-grade
structure (OECD 2010). In a multistep reform that started in 2004, the Moroccan government

redefined a job catalogue where positions are classified based on 6 characteristics: activity, tasks,
skills, place in organization, objectives and level of responsibility (OECD 2010). To take into
account the common activities of members of the same corps, these jobs are further classified
into “whole of government corps” and “specialized corps” (OECD 2010). They also assign civil
servants to each of four “ranks”: managerial positions, expertise-based positions, supervisory
positions and front-line positions. This enabled to make jobs agency-specific while recognizing
their commonalities, but also introduce useful segmentation criteria such as tasks, skills and
places in organizations. While the Tunisian context is not exactly identical, the Moroccan case
study shows that this step is feasible and presents an opportunity for collaboration and specific
exchange of actionable knowledge.
Evaluation Metrics Redefinition
A job catalogue will make it easier to determine an evaluation grid of quantifiable metrics. Once
the job is related to an activity that is clearly defined, agency-specific and skill-based, it will
become possible to develop quantifiable metrics. While profitability makes designing these
metrics in the private sector easier, case studies show that governments are able to find ways to
implement such metrics. For instance, Denmark uses a more output-driven approach (OECD,
Denmark 2012), while Bahrain uses a competence-based approach (OECD 2010). Bahrain
started implementing a competency-based model for evaluation, as part of an HR reform agenda
for the period of 2008-2014, which takes the form of a dictionary of 92 competencies with 5
levels of competency ranging from basic to expert. Using a competence-based system has also
the benefit of identifying gaps between the competence level that a job requires and the
competence level that the civil servant has, which can then inform training sessions (OECD

2010). Overall, more specific criteria that are based on competences, as well as outputs dictated
by the job description, could make the evaluation system less vague and more credible.
Reform the Reward System
The reward system could be reformed by addressing issues in the compensation structure and by
reforming promotion mechanisms.
Compensation Structure
The compensation structure will be able to reward high performance through the introduction of
Performance-related pay (PRP) (OECD, The State of the Public Service 2008). While PRP can
take the form of both merit increment (equivalent to pay raise) or one-off bonus (a one-time
bonus), the latter is better suited for the Tunisian context – especially given the budget limits.
That being said, the performance bonus should represent a larger percentage of the total
compensation than the current 2-3%. In countries that use PRP for most their government
employees not only to senior management, and that use the one-off bonus form not the merit
increment form, this bonus represents up to 10% (Germany) or even 20% (Hungary, which has
also been reform reforming its civil service employment system (Hazafi 2016)). In addition, a
stronger evaluation system will serve as a reliable foundation for a credible and fair bonus
system. Another idea to consider is to design tiers of bonuses, depending on different
performance levels, to ease the acceptance of a more important role of PRP and to reinforce the
notion of differentiation in the assignment of bonus payment.
Promotion Mechanisms
Promotion system needs to be redesigned to be reflective of performance. First, the law needs to
be changed to reflect the current practices in order to limit deviation from the de jure

mechanisms. Second, “grades” schemes need to be regenerated to better reflect organization
needs and clear differences between the contributions of different grades; in other words, they
should reflect a well-designed job catalogue.
Lastly, since a more robust evaluation system would facilitate a performance-based promotion
system (Zarrouk 2008), promotion should be based on criteria that draw on performance-related
evaluation metrics, and training cycles should shift from being a promotion mode to a
competence development mechanism. This recommendation is based on a strong belief that
promotion should reflect the current job performance, not the performance on the training itself.
Recognizing the value of L’Ecole Nationale d’Administration, this paper envisions three
programs. The first is a continuous training cycle for non-senior civil servants, which would be
offered to top-performers, and replace the education requirements of the next grade, and develop
the competences needed by the next grade. The second is a continuous training cycle for senior
civil servants – or a leadership program; this would be offered to senior civil servants who have
strong track records and are on leadership track. The third is a general training program that
consists of short-term training cycles to reinforce employees’ competences; there would be a list
of training modules to be completed for promotion eligibility, but only as one among many
performance criteria. This would not be a unique practice. In Denmark for example, public
employees receive 5-7 yearly training days on average (OECD, Denmark 2012).
In summary, the existing system could reward high performers through promotions if “grades”
reflect a well-designed job catalogue and promotion criteria reflect a well-designed evaluation
system. In the long-term, the other promotion mechanisms should be abandoned.
Some suggested immediate steps

There are also some more immediate steps – that are not entirely structural – but could help with
a structural reform.
First, an immediate and feasible step to undertake is to compile the decrees and orders related to
civil service employment and map the complementarity of those different legislative texts in one
accessible online directory. While there has been progress on facilitating online access to such
resources, they are not mapped in a way that shows their interrelation. Undertaking such a
project could facilitate the engagement of different stakeholders, scholars and organizations to
start a reform dialogue, as it would increase transparency and make the topic more accessible to
people who are not expert in Tunisian Law. The French Ministry of Public Accounts for instance
compiles all information related to Employment Management System under the Portal of Civil
Service (Ministere de l'Action et de la Fonction Publique n.d.).
Second, reducing the size of the government by incentivizing voluntary retirement may be a
necessary step to address the immediate pressure of the wage bill but also as an intermediate step
to make structural reform possible. This policy was followed by Morocco in their reform project
(OECD 2010). That being said, this will not be sufficient in altering the view of government as
employer of last resort: changing this view will job opportunities in the private sector, enabled
through a business-friendly environment – which is an entire project reform in itself.

Conclusion
The Tunisian Civil Service Employment System needs to undertake a series of structural reforms
in order to identify and reward high performers, and hence improve overall performance of Civil
Service. While the wage bill and fiscal deficit make reforms challenging, fiscal crises can push

for greater efficiency, and recent democratization can generate promises of “more service
oriented, less corrupt and more accountable public administrations” (Bunse and Fritz 2012).
Such reforms will require managing politics of reforms and aligning interests of different
stakeholders around a unique vision. While this is challenging, dialogue between stakeholders is
what earned the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.
Furthermore, through successful reform steps, Tunisia has the opportunity to show leadership
since these problems exit in other countries, including countries in the MENA region.
Next research steps could involve focusing on one ministry or agency for in-depth primary
research. Projects like compiling legislative texts or creating an organization chart of all state
agencies could also contribute in facilitating access to information and understanding of the
Tunisian Civil Service.
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